Abstract-Three-party key establishment protocol can help three participants to establish a shared secret key through interactions via public channels. In this paper, a novel three-party key agreement protocol is proposed. The protocol is based on non-commutative monoids in mathematics. It is a generic construction and one-time protocol per key establishment.
I. INTRODUCTION
A Key establishment protocol is used to derive a shared secret by two or more parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these, but no single party can predetermine the resulting value. Several key agreement protocols based on group theory have been proposed [1, 2, 3] . However, all these protocols are for two parties to establish a secret key. Those schemes cannot be transferred to three-party scenario in their present forms. On the other hand, for threeparty key agreement, the probability of possible information leakage is larger than the one of twoparty key agreement. This is because in the former case, the information amount transmitted between parties is much greater than that of the latter case. Therefore, it is interesting to propose a three-party key agreement protocol based on non-commutative monoids. In addition, the proposed key agreement should be immune from the existing attacks on algebraic method based cryptographic primitives.
In this paper, we will propose a generic threeparty key agreement based on non-commutative monoids. The protocol is of one-time per key agreement. That means the secret keys as well as public keys of three participants are used only once for each key establishment. This can help to prevent from some existing attacks.
The organization of the rest of the paper is as follows: In the next section, some computational preliminaries are presented. Section III provides the proposed three-party key establishment scheme. Section IV analyses security discussion on the proposed scheme. The last section concludes this paper.
II. PRELIMINARY
The mathematical definition for monoids will be reviewed in this section. In abstract algebra, a monoid is an algebraic structure with a single, associative binary operation and an identity element.
Definition A monoid is a set M with binary operation * : M× M → M, obeying the following axioms:
• Identity element: there exists an element e ∈ M, such that for all a ∈ M, a * e = e * a = a.
Alternatively, a monoid is a semigroup with an identity element. A monoid satisfies all the axioms of a group with the exception of having inverses. A monoid with inverses is the same thing as a group.
Definition Submonoid: A submonoid of a monoid M, is a subset N of M containing the unit element, and such that, if x, y ∈ N, then x * y ∈ N.
III. ONE-TIME THREE-PARTY KEY AGREEMENT BASED ON NON-COMMUTATIVE MONOIDS
Assume three participants Alice, Bob and Cindy will involve in the following protocol. Their unique means of communications is through public channels. Here one-time three-party key agreement indicates that the participants re-choose their secret keys for every time protocol run. This can help to prevent attacks from compromising possible longterm secret keys.
A. System setsup
Consider a 5-tuple: (S, T, α, f 1 , f 2 ), where S and T are computable and non-commutative monoids. The three maps α, f 1 and f 2 are operations over S and T and defined as follows:
They adhere to three axioms:
• Axiom 2:
• Axiom 3: Given public elements g 1 , g 2 , ..., g n ∈ S, h ∈ S is a secret element, while
are publicly known. Then, to determine h is not computable in polynomial time (i.e. it is infeasible in polynomial time). Alice, Bob and Cindy will establish a shared secret key through running the following protocol. The n 1 , n 2 , and n 3 are three positive integers. We assume S A = S B = S C for the following three monoids S A , S B , and S C . 1) Step 1.1: Alice is assigned a public monoid S A S. Suppose S A is generated by the elements a 1 , a 2 , · · ·, a n 1 .
That is, for any element x ∈ S A , x can be represented as
2) Step 1.2: Bob is assigned a public monoid S B S. Suppose S B is generated by the elements
3) Step 1.3: Cindy is assigned a public monoid S C S. Suppose S C is generated by the elements c 1 , c 2 , · · ·, c n 3 .
4)
Step 1.4: Alice randomly chooses n 1 nonnegative integers e 1 (1), e 1 (2), · · ·, e 1 (n 1 ) and computes
Alice's secret key is a while her public key includes {α(a,
Step 1.5: Bob randomly chooses n 2 nonnegative integers e 2 (1), e 2 (2), · · ·, e 2 (n 2 ) and computes
Bob's secret key is b while public key
Step 1.6: Cindy randomly chooses n 3 nonnegative integers e 3 (1), e 3 (2), · · ·, e 3 (n 3 ) and computes
Cindy's secret key is c while public key includes {α(c, a 1 ), α(c, a 2 ), · · ·, α(c, a n 1 )} and {α(c,
B. Shared key generation
Alice, Bob and Cindy share their public keys commonly. This can be achieved by publishing their public keys in a certified public key directory, e.g. a trusted public electronic board. They then follow the following steps to establish a shared secret key
Step 2.1: With Alice and Bob's public keys, Cindy can use her secret key to compute
and α(a, c) =
Cindy then computes
and α(a, c) ).
Finally, Cindy sends Ω 1 · Ω 2 ∈ T to Alice and Bob. 2) Step 2.2: With Bob and Cindy's public keys, Alice can use her secret key to compute
and
Alice then computes a, α(b, a) )
and (c, a) ).
Finally, Alice sends Ω 3 · Ω 4 ∈ T to Cindy and Bob.
3) Step 2.3: With Alice and Cindy's public keys, Bob can use his secret key to compute
Bob then computes
Finally, Bob sends Ω 5 · Ω 6 ∈ T to Alice and Cindy. The shared secret key of Alice, Bob and Cindy is
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS We first explain why Alice, Bob and Cindy can have the shared secret key F = f 1 (a, α(b, a) a, α(c, a) ) ∈ T. Then we show an adversary cannot work out the shared secret key.
A. Correctness of the shared secret key
In fact,
• Alice has Ω 3 and Ω 1 ·Ω 2 and can compute
• Cindy has Ω 2 and Ω 5 · Ω 6 and can compute
To explain Alice, Bob and Cindy share the key a, α(c, a) ), it is sufficient to show F 1 = F 2 = F 3 = F . In fact, by Axiom 2, we have c, α(b, c)) · f 1 (c, α(a, c)) ) a, α(c, a) ) c, α(b, c)) · f 1 (c, α(a, c)) ) , α(c, a) )
(8d) c, α(a, c) ) a, α(c, a) ) a, α(b, a) ). Similarly, an adversary cannot work out f 2 (a, α(c, a)) and f 2 (c, α(b, c)) in polynomial time.
D. Security against existing attacks on algebraic based cryptographic primitives
Anshel et al. proposed a commutator key agreement protocol based on braid groups and their colored Burau representation [1] . Lee et al. proposed a summit set attack on Anshel et al.'s protocol [5] . In fact, the protocols in [1] which were broken by Lee et al. were only some instances of the key agreement based on braid groups. That attack could not be applied to the generic construction of Anshel et al.'s protocol [1] . Therefore, that attack could not be applied to our three-party key establishment either. This is because (1) our key agreement is a generic construction; (2) our key agreement is based on non-commutative monoids; (3) the key agreement is one-time per key establishment. In [4] , Vasco et al. proposed two attacks on a public key cryptosystem based on free partially commutative monoids and groups. However, their attacks cannot be applied to our three-party key agreement protocol. This is because: On the one hand, their attacks are ciphertext only attacks and chosen ciphertext attacks while our protocol is key agreement. On the other hand, the monoids in our paper are assumed to be non-commutative.
Therefore, the adversary cannot compute the shared secret key a, α(b, a)) · f 2 (c, α(b, c)) · f 2 (a, α(c, a) ) in polynomial time.
Remark: In this paper, we only consider the security of the protocol in polynomial time. This is reasonable because the secret keys of participants for one key agreement are used only once.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we have proposed a three-party key agreement protocol. The protocol is novel because it is the first three-party key establishment based on non-commutative monoids. The purpose of the paper is to present a generic construction for designing three-party key agreement based on noncommutative monoids. Therefore, our next research is to give a concrete three-party key agreement protocol and show how exactly the parameters are to be chosen.
